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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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                           SOUTHERN DIVISION
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    KARA LYNN McMURRAY,
                                    ) CIVIL ACTION
                                      NO. PJM-20-919
 5
               Plaintiff.
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    LIEUTENANT RICHARD JOHN TALLANT)
    et al.,
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               Defendants.
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           TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS PROCEEDINGS - EXCERPT -
                            JUDGE'S RULING
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                BEFORE THE HONORABLE PETER J. MESSITTE
                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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                 TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2023; 12:25 P.M.
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                          GREENBELT, MARYLAND
    APPEARANCES:
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    FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
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          ***COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOTYPE NOTES***
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APPEARANCES (Continued):
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THE COURT: All right. All right. Well, we revisit McMurray vs. Tallant once again. The essential facts don't need to be set forth in great detail, but the plaintiff, McMurray, was a police officer in the Prince George's County Department, and the individual defendant, Tallant, was her lieutenant there. And the allegation, essential allegation was that I believe in February of 2017, they were at the police -- while off duty but still at a police -- a social center, that in the woods one night when the plaintiff went to relieve herself, Defendant Tallant went as well, and she has alleged that he sexually assaulted her.

The way she describes the assault is digital penetration on her genital area. That certainly would suffice as a sexual assault.

The fact that there may have been a criminal conviction based on that, of course, is essentially irrelevant. This is a civil case, so the Court need not carry on that.

So then the question is what happens in the period after, and there is some indication that the plaintiff did tell her then boyfriend, who was a sergeant also I think in her chain of command, or if not, even that might not be relevant, that she has been assaulted, but she does say, Don't say anything about it. I don't want to get -- essentially create a problem for myself.

Now, she says that, among other things, it's fear for her

career, if not shame and denial, which seems to be very characteristic of these sexual assaults in being reported. But eventually, the word gets out, and it's known fairly soon after that something has occurred between Tallant and plaintiff. And within a couple of years, despite the fact that there has been no formal complaint pursuant to the sexual harassment policy of the County, word gets out that this event took place, and there is a series of encounters that the plaintiff has with police administration.

All the while, plaintiff argues, although defendant now denies, but plaintiff argues that she's being ridiculed, she's being threatened, she's being humiliated, and she's fearful now for what the outcome might be as to her career.

And while she does have some response from the County, she eventually is transferred from Patrol to the Evidence Unit, she says not at her request, although defendant insists that's what it was. She says she was told that is where she was going to be. And the argument is the Evidence Unit is less -- while the salary might be the same, it's a less prestigious unit with different composition, with different responsibilities, and so on, and not really the opportunity for promotion that one would have if one stayed on Patrol and went through the other avenues of potential promotion.

And so that's how the case proceeded. Eventually, the things got bad enough that the plaintiff, while she was out at

various times for maternity leave and so on, came back and said, essentially, The hostility of the environment is such that I cannot go on and I am being forced to resign. That's the gist of what the case is about.

So there are a number of causes of action that the Court addresses in connection with the County. There is, first of all, the hostile work environment claim under Title VII, which is Count Five, and then retaliation under Count Six, and then to jump back to the federal constitutional claim under 42, Section 1983, which is Count Two.

To start with the sexual harassment claim, it is true that there was a policy in place, although there is some argument, I will perhaps take it as defendant argues -- I did not see much by way of argument on the defendant's side that the prima facie case had not been made here, but the argument that there was no adverse employment action would be part of the prima facie case under <code>McDonnell Douglas</code>, and clearly, there is a legitimate issue of material fact regarding whether there was an adverse employment action in being reassigned from Patrol to Evidence, and I have heard that, and that could be argument either way, but it is not meat for summary judgment in defendant's favor.

But in any event, the action that she did not follow the policy strictly speaking, the Court allows that, in these circumstances, the fear, shame, humiliation of the sexual

assault by the employer effectively -- by the supervisor could well justify delay in reporting formally under a sexual harassment policy.

I would add as well, the boyfriend was a sergeant. Where was he in terms of making a report? Even if she said to him, Don't say anything, is he discharging his duty by not saying anything? Does he have an obligation as a boyfriend that supersedes his duty as a police officer? Arguable that that is not a valid defense. And he knew right away. So the idea that she took some time before it all came to pass is not, in my view, dispositive in defendant's favor at this point.

So did she follow the policy or not? Arguably, she did, under the circumstances, appropriately so. Did the County act in any way immediately to assuage her concerns? To some extent, yes, there was an investigation, although, arguably, first by an investigator who had an alliance with the defendant who arguably told the plaintiff it's not important. That's not a very persuasive argument in favor of the County.

And then the other arguments along the way about what was done for her, again, when there was brought -- when it was brought to the attention of one of the officers, of one of the higher ups that she was fearful of what was going to happen on the street if she didn't get backup, an argument is made -- or the evidence suggests that a State's Attorney made the report to the officer, and what is done? Nothing, according to the

plaintiff.

So, again, the County is implicated at every level here about what they were doing. When she was reassigned, was it, in fact, retaliation for being reassigned? Arguably, yes. Perhaps not. But at least at this point, not really fit for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

And so when you talk about the hostile work environment, certainly to the extent that a female officer in a presumably male-oriented police department is hearing these rumors and threats floating around sometimes directly, according to counsel, she's apt to be kind of nervous in terms of what the outcomes would be, and, therefore, unhappy in her work. And if she is assigned to a lesser prestigious department not at her request, she says, that's another way in which one could argue retaliation.

And, finally, on the 1983 claim, clearly, there are things that are arguably going on in the police department. Whether it's the culture, if you will, or the reasonable fear that a police officer who is a snitch is -- is not going to get backup on the street if she is a patrolman, that certainly is a concern that could arguably be laid at the doorstep of the County.

So did they do everything that they could reasonably have done? They did some things. Did they do enough? Arguably not. And, so, all the elements, it seems to me, are fairly

present that -- in favor of denying the motion for summary 1 2 judgment on the County's part. 3 This case is ready for trial. It would be an interesting There certainly are strong equities I think that the 4 5 plaintiff can put forward here, but if the County and the police department feel that they -- they have something to say 6 7 by way of their defense, and perhaps they do, then the time to do it is at the trial, but not here at summary judgment. The motion is denied for the reasons the Court has just 10 stated, and I will enter an order to that effect. 11 Now, what I'd like counsel to do is to get together and 12 determine how much trial time you might need. It feels like 13 maybe two weeks of trial, at a minimum, two to three weeks. We 14 are talking the fall I think the soonest that we would do this, maybe toward the late fall, October, November, something like 15 16 that to try it. 17 Does that sound about right for counsel? 18 MR. ROBERTS: I would say so, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Sorry. 20 MR. ROBERTS: I would agree. 21 MR. CORNBROOKS: Yes, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Yeah. Counsel, talk to each other and 23 see where you are in terms of your own schedules, and then call

If there is any -- I don't know whether you feel there is

chambers, and let's try and set up the -- the discussion.

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    -- I mean, I guess I got to hold open this possibility, if you
    feel that there is need for leave to take further discovery
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    either based on what has been filed with the Circuit Court,
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    okay, whether you have some issue about the psychological
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    effect of being a victim of sexual assault, that's up to you,
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    Mr. Roberts, to see whether that could be entertained or not.
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          Otherwise, we are ready to set the matter for trial
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    unless we hear otherwise. Thank you, Counsel, for your
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    arguments.
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              MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, if I might, I want to send
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    those documents to you.
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              THE COURT: Would you, please?
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              MR. ROBERTS: The email address?
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              THE COURT: Kim will give you hers.
                           Yes. Yes. I will write it down for
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              MS. PLUMER:
16
    you.
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              MR. ROBERTS:
                            Thank you. Thank you.
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          (The proceedings were concluded at 12:35 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, Renee A. Ewing, an Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings taken on the date and time previously stated in the above matter; that the testimony of witnesses and statements of the parties were correctly recorded in machine shorthand by me and thereafter transcribed under my supervision with computer-aided transcription to the best of my ability; and that I am neither of counsel nor kin to any party in said action, nor interested in the outcome thereof.

Renee A Ewing

Renee A. Ewing, RPR, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter April 4, 2023